



rbcpa.com

2017 Investment Conference
November 14, 2017



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Ronald R. Redfield CPA,PFS started with the firm in **1983** (34 years ago) and became a partner in 1989. redfield@rbcpa.com

Alan B. Starinsky CPA,PFS became a partner in 1995. Alan is in charge of our accounting and tax division. astarinsky@rbcpa.com

Ron and Alan have worked together for 30 years since 1987.





All of us have dedicated a total of **200 years** so far to RBS. We really do seem to whistle while we work.



(Top L – R) Arlene '86 (retired 2017), Denise '96, Jim '96, Ron '83, Alan '87, Chris '84, Donna '98, Debbie '06

Milford Blonsky, CPA (Mr. Blonsky), passed away on September 11th, 2017. He was 95 years old. Mr. Blonsky was a friend, boss, mentor and business partner. He was always kind, patient, honest and understanding. He was admired for his requirements of precision in accounting, and making sure the ledgers proved out without “fudging.” His adage of “garbage in, garbage out” is embedded in me. I remember him as a boy, I would go to the office on 701 Newark Avenue, in Elizabeth, of Redfield, Blonsky & Co., of which Mr. Blonsky co-founded with my dad, and Mr. Blonsky would be busy working on the mainframe computer. He had early version of a space wars computer game that Stephen and I would play (actually Stephen, as I had difficulty figuring it out.) So many good memories of a good man. He will be missed.





Historically, we typically, but not always, outperformed the stock averages in down years, and underperformed the same averages when they have strong years. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results.

\$47,837,192 under management as of December 31, 2016.

I manage our own portfolios and our families portfolios in the same manner we manage those of our clients. **I eat my own cooking!**





I am incredibly cognizant as to our duty to our clients. We have an intense responsibility, and we take that responsibility very seriously. We are stewards of your capital, and will always put your portfolio in front of anything else.

Our interest is in the structure of our clients portfolios, and we will not alter that view in hopes of client satisfaction.

We will not chase returns in an attempt to meet or exceed our benchmarks.

"I buy a company based on what I project the price to be in 10 or 15 years, based on projected forward operational results and fundamentals. I often map this out for 10 to 15 years. I compare this to the current price, determine potential annual ROI's, and decide from there if the company is deemed investment worthy." **Ronald R. Redfield CPA/PFS**
11/10/17



We practice value investing. We try to find companies or investments that we feel are selling at a price that is below their intrinsic value. We emphasize a long-term approach to investing. We focus on the investment itself and not its short-term stock price performance. Our portfolios are often concentrated and focused on a limited number of investments.

We do not focus a great deal on the day-to-day "noise" in the markets. We attempt to focus on the information that will have a long-term impact on our current investments and potential investments.

Our thesis is based on the assumption that for the majority of the companies we own, their dividends are sustainable and that they are still fairly priced.

Markets will always fluctuate, and corrections will always occur.



RBS Performance Summary

Average Annual Total Returns as of 10/31/17	19Years + 10 months	15 Years	10 Years	5 Years	3 Years	1 Year	YTD (Not Annual-ized)
RBS All returns presented net of fees	7.63%	8.79%	3.76%	10.89%	6.02%	24.16%	13.05%
S&P 500	6.62%	9.38%	6.91%	15.19%	10.59%	23.63%	16.68%
Tweedy Brown Value Fund	N/A	7.44%	5.53%	9.14%	5.42%	19.71%	13.26%
Vanguard Balanced Index Fund (VIBNX)	6.5%	8.0%	6.3%	9.9%	7.4%	14.7%	10.9%

Please refer to our disclosures page.



RBS Investment Return Table

Year Ending	RBS (1)	S&P 500 (2)	Relative Results (1)-(2)
1998	5.00%	28.58%	(23.58)
1999	7.50%	21.04%	(13.54)
2000	11.20%	(9.10%)	20.30
2001	0.10%	(11.89%)	11.99
2002	1.10%	(22.10%)	23.20
2003	52.60%	28.69%	23.91
2004	7.90%	10.88%	(2.98)
2005	7.30%	4.91%	2.39
2006	26.00%	15.79%	10.21
2007	(0.40%)	5.49%	(5.89)
2008	(34.70%)	(37.00%)	2.30
2009	22.10%	26.46%	(4.36)
2010	1.30%	15.06%	(13.76)
2011	0.50%	2.12%	(1.62)
2012	14.10%	15.96%	(1.86)
2013	24.80%	32.22%	(7.42)
2014	11.80%	13.57%	(1.77)
2015	(7.22%)	1.33%	(8.55)
2016	13.04	11.82	1.22
10/31/17	13.05	16.68	(3.63)

Please refer to our Disclosures page

Clients will often ask us to give a market prediction. Our typical answer is that we have no clue what the stock market will do over a short period. Over the short term (short term being 5 years or less), anything can happen. In the book, *The Money Game*, Adam Smith (George J. W. Goodman) pointed out when J. P. Morgan was asked what the market would do, he said, "It will fluctuate."



"Did you hear the cops finally busted Madame Marie for tellin' fortunes better than they do?"
Bruce Springsteen 1972



I typically read 5 newspapers every day. Of which 3 are in print form. I **mix up all the sections of all the newspapers like a deck of cards**, arrange them randomly, and then I begin my reading.



“Read 500 pages every day, that’s how knowledge works. It builds up, like compound interest.” **Warren Buffett**

Books I have read since last conference:

			Date Finished	My Rating 1 - 10
Good Earth, The	Buck, Pearl S.	1931	12-Nov-17	7
Gold Coast	DeMille, Nelson	1997	5-Nov-17	10
Big Agenda	Horowitz, David	2017	2-Nov-17	1
Money Machine: The Surprisingly Simple Power of Value Investing	Smith, Gary	2017	1-Nov-17	8
Prize, The :The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power	Yergin, Daniel	1991	25-Oct-17	8
Gatekeepers, The - How the White House Chiefs of Staff Define Every Presidency	Whipple, Chris	2017	15-Oct-17	10
Little Book of Big Dividends, The	Carlson, Charles	2010	15-Oct-17	8
A Wealth of Common Sense	Carlson, Ben	2015	12-Sep-17	8
Meditations	Aurelius, Marcus	160 BC	24-Aug-17	7
Charm School, The	DeMille, Nelson	2010	17-Aug-17	10
Huckleberry Finn	Twain, Mark	1884	15-Jul-17	9
Zodiac	Stephenson, Neal	2007	4-Jul-17	5
Book of Genesis, The	R. Crumb	2009	2-Jul-17	10
Count of Monte Cristo, The	Dumas, Alexandre	1844	25-Jun-17	10
Public Utility Regulations, The A to Z of	Olson, Wayne P.	2015	23-Jun-17	8
Anthem	Rand, Ayn	1938	19-Jun-17	9
Franklin, Benjamin	Doren, Carl Van	1938	12-Jun-17	10
Democracy: Stories from the Long Road to Freedom	Rice, Condoleezza	2017	23-May-17	7
Winter on Fire: Ukraine's Fight for Freedom (Film)	Afinesky, Evgeny	2015	8-May-17	7
Predictably Irrational, The	Ariely, Dan	2008	22-Apr-17	7
Napoleon	Herold, Christopher	2017	14-Apr-17	8
Lost Colony of the Confederacy, The	Harter, Eugene C.	2000	14-Apr-17	6
Foods that cause you to lose weight : the negative calorie effect	Neal, Barnard	2016	5-Apr-17	6
Inferno, The	Dante	14th Century	20-Mar-17	9
One Year After: A John Matherson Novel	Forstchen, William	2015	19-Feb-17	7
Deathworld	Harrison, Harry	1960	31-Jan-17	8
Aesop's Fables	Aesop	Unknown	31-Dec-16	10
Lincoln: A Biography	Charnwood, Lord	1916	12-Feb-17	9
Lincoln and the Power of the Press	Holzer, Harold	2014	29-Jan-17	8



The expected dividend yield of our portfolios as of October 31, 2017 is 2.40%.


All rates are listed as of October 31, 2017.

RBS expected dividend yield	5 Year Treasury	10 Year Treasury	30 Year Treasury
2.40%	2.01%	2.376%	2.875%

Historically, we felt most secure when a company's dividend is 2/3rds (66%) of the 5 Year Treasury. Our current expected dividend is **20%** > than the 5 Year Treasury, and **1%** > than the 10 Year Treasury and **84%** of the 30 Year Treasury.

At last years conference, our expected dividend yield was 2.80% which was 212% > than the 5 year Treasury, which was 1.32% at the time.

We still have a margin of safety, but that margin has contracted materially.



When using the **3 Month US Treasury** rate of 6% as a benchmark, it would take **12 years** to double your money.

The 3 Month Treasury as of November 9, 2017 was **1.203%**. Using the rule of 72, It would would take **60 years** to double your money. At last years conference, the rate was 0.500% or **144 years** to double. At our 2015 conference the rate was 0.013% of **637 years** to double. At our 2014 conference the rate was 0.013% of **5,538 years** to double.

"Success comes from curiosity, concentration, perseverance and self-criticism." **Albert Einstein**


It is still my opinion that most bonds have been set up for poor returns going forward. Notice how much interest rates below have increased. Certainly yield curve flattening of some type. Inverted curves often predict recessions.

Top Savings Deposit Yields from Barron's

Type	11/13/17	11/14/16	11/16/15	11/7/14	11/15/10
Money Market	1.49%	1.10%	1.10%	1.04%	1.20%
6 Month CD	1.49%	0.85%	1.05%	0.82%	1.14%
1 Year CD	1.67%	1.26%	1.30%	1.14%	1.40%
2 ½ Year CD	1.74%	1.52%	1.50%	1.25%	1.74%
5 Year CD	2.37%	2.00%	2.45%	2.32%	2.75%


It is important that an investor understands how changes in interest rates, credit quality, liquidity, and inflation would affect fixed Income investments.

This is a graph of The 3 Month Treasury bill since 1934



"Interest rates have been at stupid levels, they've been held down... they're like beach balls under water." **Stan Druckenmiller November 2016**

This is a graph of The 10 Year Treasury bill since 1962



This is a graph of The 10 Year Treasury bill since 1790 – Source Businessinsider.com




Natural Gas

U.S. National Average Natural Gas Price

End of day Commodity Futures Price Quotes for Natural Gas (NYMEX)

Sign up now.
E*TRADE



The price of natural gas has increased 22% during the last twelve months. The price is still off of its 2008 highs by 75%!

The price of Natural Gas has stabilized it's decade long decline for the last twelve months. Low Natural Gas prices benefit the consumer, but are a drag to earnings on utilities, especially nuclear operators.



OPEN
3.208


DAY RANGE
3.171 - 3.224

VOLUME
93,785

PREVIOUS CLOSE
3.200

52WK RANGE
2.847 - 3.747

Copper is often referred to as “Dr. Copper.” It is often looked at as an early economic indicator. The price is currently at nearly the same price as 10 years ago.





10 Largest Holdings as of October 31, 2017 – These accounted for 53% of our entire portfolio.

	Company	Symbol	% of Total	Price	Average Cost	Original Year Bought
1	Bank of America	BAC	7.32%	\$27.39	\$13.02	2011
2	Gazprom	OGZPY	6.87%	\$4.29	\$5.08	2014
3	Citigroup	C	6.61%	\$73.50	\$41.34	2008
4	JP Morgan Chase	JPM	6.35%	\$100.61	\$42.92	2008
5	Exxon Mobil	XOM	5.24%	\$83.35	\$84.37	2008
6	PBF Energy	PBF	4.57%	\$28.97	\$24.78	2013
7	Intel Corp.	INTC	4.53%	\$45.49	\$27.73	2012
8	Conoco Phillips	COP	4.27%	\$51.15	\$41.98	2009
9	First Energy	FE	3.71%	\$32.95	\$32.54	2013
10	Schlumberger	SLB	3.67%	\$64.00	\$68.46	2014

Please refer to our disclosures page.



10 Largest Gains as of October 31, 2017 - These accounted for 19.70% of our October 31, 2017 holdings.

	Company	Symbol	Price	Average Cost	% Gain YTD 10/31/17	Original Year Bought
1	NRG Energy	NRG	\$25.00	\$12.74	105.0%	2011/2014
2	Canopy Growth	TWMJF	\$12.57	\$1.30	84.3%	2014
3	First Solar Corp.	FSLR	\$54.82	\$49.61	72.3%	2014
4	Inovalon Holdings	INOV	\$16.75	\$9.91	63.1%	2016
5	Castle Brands	ROX	\$1.19	\$0.83	62.8%	2016
6	Microsoft Corp.	MSFT	\$83.18	\$27.37	35.5%	2005
7	Oracle Corp.	ORCL	\$50.90	\$37.47	35.0%	2011
8	Intrawest Resorts	SNOW	N/A	N/A	31.4%	2016
9	Wal-Mart Stores	WMT	\$87.31	\$59.80	29.8%	2009
10	Intel Corp.	INTC	\$45.49	\$27.73	28.0%	2012

Please refer to our disclosures page.



RBS 10 Largest YTD Losses as of October 31, 2017 - These accounted for 23.28% of our October 31, 2017 holdings.

	Company	Symbol	Price	Average Cost	% Loss YTD 10/31/17	Original Year Bought
1	Frontier Corp.	FTR	\$12.11	\$47.60	(72.3%)	2012
2	Frontier Preferred's	FTRPR	\$19.90	\$45.37	(45.0%)	2017
3	Sheritt International	SHERF	\$1.02	N/A	(32.1%)	2011
4	Scana Corp.	SCG	\$43.14	\$55.90	(27.4%)	2017
5	Schlumberger	SLB	\$64.00	\$68.46	(20.7%)	2014
6	Gazprom	OGZPY	\$4.29	\$5.08	(11.8%)	2014
7	OPKO Health	OPK	\$6.73	\$7.39	(10.5%)	2017
8	St. Joe Company	JOE	\$17.80	\$19.71	(6.2%)	2010
9	Exxon Mobil	XOM	\$83.35	\$84.37	(5.0%)	2008
10	Brunswick Bancorp	BRBW	\$7.35	\$5.38	(4.5%)	2015

Please refer to our disclosures page.



Our **10** largest holdings made up **53%** of our entire portfolio as of October 31, 2017.

We had **36 positions** in our portfolio as of October 31, 2017.

Our **position size is typically based on the conviction** we have in the investment, as well as the relative risk of the holding, along with the current price of the holding.

Ideally, we would like to own less than 15 core positions.

We attempt to keep portfolio turnover low. Our average turnover for the last 5 years has been 25% annually.

We have reduced allocations this year for 11 companies, for valuation reasons, or to fit in other investments. We eliminated 6 positions this year for reasons of perceived over-valuation, risk levels, change in thesis, and one company was taken over.



List of our holdings with allocations as of October 31, 2017

Portfolio Position		Market Price 10/31/2017	Unit Cost	YTD Performance 10/31/2017	Allocation %	Aggregate Allocation
1 BAC	Bank Of America Corporation	\$ 27.39	\$13.02	25.50%	7.32%	7.32%
2 OGZPY	Pjsc Gazprom Spons Adr	\$ 4.29	\$5.08	-11.80%	6.87%	14.19%
3 C	Citigroup Inc	\$ 73.50	\$41.34	25.00%	6.61%	20.80%
4 JPM	JP Morgan Chase & Co	\$ 100.61	\$42.92	19.30%	6.35%	27.15%
5 XOM	Exxon Mobil Corporation	\$ 83.35	\$84.37	-5.00%	5.24%	32.39%
6 PBF	PBF Energy Inc	\$ 28.97	\$24.78	8.20%	4.57%	36.96%
7 INTC	Intel Corp	\$ 45.49	\$27.73	28.00%	4.53%	41.49%
8 COP	ConocoPhillips	\$ 51.15	\$41.98	4.30%	4.27%	45.76%
9 FE	First Energy Corp	\$ 32.95	\$32.54	10.80%	3.71%	49.47%
10 SLB	Schlumberger	\$ 64.00	\$68.46	-20.70%	3.67%	53.14%
11 WMT	Wal-Mart Stores	\$ 87.31	\$59.80	29.80%	3.22%	56.36%
12 SCG	Scana Corp Com	\$ 43.14	\$55.90	-27.40%	3.06%	59.42%
13 MSFT	Microsoft Corporation	\$ 83.18	\$27.37	35.50%	2.84%	62.26%
14 MRK	Merck & Company, Inc. Common St	\$ 55.09	\$55.00	NMF	2.45%	64.71%
15 AIG	American International Group, I	\$ 64.61	\$48.32	0.60%	2.41%	67.12%
16 NRG	NRG Energy	\$ 25.00	\$12.74	105.00%	2.38%	69.50%
17 CVX	Chevron	\$ 115.89	\$97.30	1.60%	2.35%	71.85%
18 PEG	Public Service Enterprise Group	\$ 49.20	\$32.88	15.20%	2.29%	74.14%
19 EXC	Exelon Corporation	\$ 40.21	\$33.89	16.50%	1.85%	75.99%
20 ALK	Alaska Air Group Inc Com	\$ 66.03	\$66.19	NMF	1.82%	77.81%
21 FSLR	First Solar Inc	\$ 54.82	\$49.61	72.30%	1.82%	79.63%
22 TWMJF	Canopy Growth Corp Com	\$ 12.57	\$1.30	84.30%	1.65%	81.28%
23 MNDO	Mind Cti Ltd	\$ 2.69	\$2.36	15.80%	1.59%	82.87%
24 GILD	Gilead Sciences, Inc. (Drugs)	\$ 74.96	\$66.77	15.80%	1.56%	84.43%
25 ORCL	Oracle Corporation	\$ 50.90	\$37.47	35.00%	1.47%	85.90%
26 FTR	Frontier Communications Corp	\$ 12.11	\$47.60	-72.30%	1.37%	87.27%
27 INOV	Inovalon Holdings Inc Cl A	\$ 16.75	\$9.91	63.10%	1.35%	88.62%
28 OPK	Opko Health Inc Com	\$ 6.73	\$7.39	-10.50%	1.30%	89.92%
29 TWTR	Twitter Inc Com	\$ 20.62	\$16.48	25.00%	1.30%	91.22%
30 AAXN	Axon Enterprise Inc Com	\$ 22.97	\$18.00	-5.00%	1.12%	92.34%
31 JOE	St. Joe Company	\$ 17.80	\$19.71	-6.20%	0.85%	93.19%
32 BRBW	Brunswick Bancorp Cm	\$ 7.35	\$5.38	-4.50%	0.77%	93.96%
33 BGFV	Big 5 Sporting Goods Corp Com	\$ 6.35	\$7.10	NMF	0.76%	94.72%
34 CFG	Citizens Financial Group Inc C Om	\$ 38.01	\$36.84	3.80%	0.49%	95.21%
35 ROX	Castle Brands Inc Com	\$ 1.19	\$0.83	62.80%	0.44%	95.65%
36 TRTC	Terra Tech Corp Com	\$ 0.19	\$0.19	NMF	0.24%	95.89%
37 FTRPR	Frontier Communications Corp M Andatory Pfd Conv Ser A	\$ 19.90	\$45.37	-45.00%	0.15%	96.04%
	Cash			NMF	3.96%	100.00%

Please refer to our disclosures page



We take a long-term approach to investing. We consider long-term to be in the area of 5 to 10 years, or more. When we purchase equity securities, we typically expect to hold the investment for a long period of time. Often our goal would be to hold security positions permanently. Yet, history has shown us that the goal of permanent holdings has not been achieved. Our average portfolio turnover rate over the last 5 years is 25%.

We attempt to be tax efficient in our portfolios.

If you are an investment client of ours, please **let us know if your CPA would like us to harvest any tax losses or gains.** We can't promise we can do so, but we can certainly evaluate it.





We charge 1% of managed assets.

A decline in stock values is not a surprising event. It is a recurring event. As normal as frigid air in January in New Jersey.

Bonds have been in a 30 year plus bull market, and I would not be surprised to see that invert to a prolonged severe bear market in bonds.

“You make most of your money in a bear market, you just don’t realize it at the time.”

Shelby Cullom Davis

“If you expect to continue to purchase stocks throughout your life, you should welcome price declines as a way to add stocks more cheaply to your portfolio.”

Warren Buffett



Our Investment Strategy Page 1 of 2:

1. Search for investments we think will **produce future cash flows and earnings**, and purchase these investments at a price that we think will present us with Returns on Investment which are greater than the prevailing interest rate and inflation. Patience is key for this.
2. I buy a company based on what I project the price to be in 10 or 15 years, based on projected forward operational results and fundamentals. I often map this out for 10 to 15 years. I compare this to the current price, determine potential annual ROI's, and decide from there if the company is deemed investment worthy.

"I love buying into fear, and selling or not owning companies where investor complacency or euphoria exists." **Ronald R. Redfield CPA/PFS, November 3, 2015**



Our Investment Strategy Page 2 of 2:

3. We continue to invest in companies that our research currently considers to be financially strong, able to withstand severe business downturns, pays a dividend, and also buys back their own shares, at a price we consider reasonable. We do have a small portion of investments that are not as financially strong, but have a “story” behind them, and hence our investment.

4. With all of our analysis, we understand that **our thesis is merely a road map**. We constantly look to pierce holes in our thesis, bring in potential negatives and positives, and do our best to have a reasonable understanding of their future operations and cash flows. We adjust our investment if necessary to our ongoing research.



Our goal is to attempt to maximize investment returns, while limiting or avoiding permanent losses.

We **typically have a defensive** nature to our portfolios, and once again we remind investors that we will typically under-perform the S&P 500 during strong years, and typically out-perform the S&P 500 in years where the S&P 500 has not performed well.

Because of **our defensive nature**, I don't think we should be compared to the S&P 500. Yet, I really don't know what a proper comparative benchmark would be.

Hence, we also show our comparative results to Tweedy Browne Value Fund.

"When reading, follow your curiosity. Read things to don't agree with. This contributes to being actively open minded." **Michael Mauboussin**

Please refer to our disclosures page.

A detailed look at our research methods – A Road Map

We attempt to determine the intrinsic value of a company, based on a thorough analysis of the fundamental business factors, the company and industry conditions. We read SEC filings, including financial statements, annual reports, company or industry conference calls, investor and analyst meetings, one on one company meetings, and industry events.


When looking at an investment, we attempt to project and focus on a company's future generation of cash flow and earnings, their balance sheet, and other financial statements and disclosures. We attempt to analyze the quality of their current and future earnings. We attempt to introduce stress-related circumstances to our projections. We also project the amounts that we think could be returned to shareholders via dividends. We determine what we think the future return on investment will be over a mid to long period of time. Typically we use a 5 year to 15 year "road map" in our analysis. Of course this "road map" is constantly changing and revised for changes in conditions. Typically we look to invest in a company when we have confidence in the predictability of their future cash flow stream, and we are comfortable with the price we are paying for this projected future cash flow and earnings stream. At the same time, we constantly look for flaws in our reasoning or thesis. As CPAs, we have an in-depth knowledge in interpreting financial statements and their footnotes. Our extensive research is embedded in our clients' portfolios.

Some of our current investment themes Page 1 of 4

- Bear market in bonds. Thesis is based on liquidity (buyers may want to exit and no one to sell to), bond quality & potentially increasing interest rates. **The ability to earn returns in excess of CD's accompanied by total safety, does not exist.**
- Blurb from 1980 *"The recent crash in the bond market- which compared to a 50% drop in the DJIA in a couple of weeks."* **Value Line 3/28/1980**
- We do not have any fixed income investments in our portfolios. For those that require safety, they should have treasuries or CD's.
- Concern of mass herding to ETF's and passive investing, which could be leading to inflated asset prices, and potential liquidity concerns in a stress scenario, including bear market selling.
- Concern of aging demographic base, issue for economic growth, along with inflation possibilities to cure legacy debt issues.

Some of our current investment themes Page 2 of 4


- Concern of a flattening or inverted yield curve, but it isn't flat or inverted (yet). Look at interest rate charts a few pages back, and compare the last several years (or centuries). The following is a chart from the November 10, 2017 issue of Value Line.



Please refer to our disclosures page.

Some of our current investment themes Page 3 of 4

An inverted yield curve typically spells slower growth, heightened credit difficulties or a combination of the two. A flattish curve is the augury of recession, and inverted curve virtually guarantees one.



Please refer to our disclosures page.

Some of our current investment themes Page 4 of 4

- Sell into euphoria.
- Investors must be reminded that corrections and recessions are the norm.
- Don't chase yield.
- Warren Buffett's long-time partner Charlie Munger identifies that the most difficult process for a value investor is typically *"doing nothing, or sitting on your ass investing."* Again, **research and learning is constant, but portfolio activity is not.**
- What would Marty do? (Marty Zweig – you can search that term on our site).
- *"Berkshire stock has gone down 50% four times since I owned it."* **Warren Buffett**
3/1/10

We have pared down and eliminated more positions than has been typical for us.

Our Investments are often held for many years, and are often permanent holdings

We are typically long term buyers and holders. We attempt to keep portfolio turnover low. Our average turnover for the last 5 years has been 25% annually. This year, so far, our turnover is 34%. We pared down many positions down recently, and eliminated several positions. The eliminated positions, so far this year, were Entergy, Inovalon, Pfizer, Sherritt International, Valeant, and Intrawest (bought out).

We are constantly looking for clues where our thesis on ownership has changed.

As you will notice throughout this handout, we have owned many of our holdings for a long time.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Examples of some of our Investment Notes and Thesis:

We pared down many companies to allocation levels that I was comfortable with, as well as to create space for new ideas.

The companies where we reduced our allocation so far this year were:, AIG, Axon (Taser), Canopy Growth (Tweed), Conoco Phillips, First Solar, NRG Energy, Oracle, Wal-Mart, Exelon, Public Service Enterprise Group, Microsoft, and Twitter.

These companies still account for 27.0 % of our portfolios as of October 31, 2017.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Banks and Financials are 24% of our portfolio allocation Page 1 of 2

Net interest margins are still at nearly the lowest level in 11 years. I expect interest rates to rise, which would enable net interest margins to go up. This is typically where banks make most of their profit. They borrow cheap and lend with a more expensive rate.

Credit quality of these institutions has been and is expected to remain strong. The capital levels and balance sheets are much stronger than they were before and during the financial crisis.

All 3 of our large bank holdings (BAC, C and JPM) have balance sheets and capital ratios that are nearly their strongest in their history.

I think regulators recognize the financial strength of banks and will continue to let them increase the dividends to their shareholders, as well as allow stock repurchases. Regulators remain, and are understandably expected to view the most important function of these institutions is to pay out their depositors or the insurance contracts, as opposed to protecting shareholders.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Banks and Financials are 24% of our portfolio allocation Page 2 of 2

I continue to think the banks we own to be somewhat undervalued based on historical metrics. A few of these historical metrics would be price to book value, and forward price earnings ratios. I also think their dividend yields will continue to increase, as, or if, the US Government continues to give them continued leeway to increase their dividends as their financial ratios continue to get stronger.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

I wish we never bought Frontier (FTR)

So far, it looks like I made a mistake buying Frontier (FTR) in our portfolios. That position accounted for an approximate realized and unrealized loss of ~ (3.0%) of our portfolios year to date through October 31, 2017.

I apologize for such a mistake, yet in investing, mistakes will occur.

We are not selling our position in FTR. You may have seen a purchase of FTR in your portfolios on November 9th. Our plan is to sell the older shares after December 10th or so, and keep the desired allocation, but recognize a large tax loss, which can be used to offset our gains as we pared down or eliminated some investments, as described in this handout.

"Perfection will not happen. Mistakes are natural. Don't repeat them. Strive to do your best."

Michael Mauboussin

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Bank of America (BAC) \$27.39 October 31, 2017 Page 1 of 2

Bank of America is one of the largest financial institutions in the United States and the world. The Price to Book value and forward P/E are low relative to their historic averages. Price to Book is primary reason for owning, accompanied by an expected increase in net interest margin if interest rates start to rise. Thesis is based on continued earnings growth. I expect that dividend increases will continue to occur, as the government continues to relax its stance on Bank of America, via future stress tests.

Yield is 1.75% (\$0.48). Earnings expected at \$1.80 which would give a P/E of 15.22X. The Dividend payout ratio was 22% in F2015, and 23% in F2016. Dividend payout ratio expected to be 27% and 30% for F2017 and F2018 respectively. ROE has been NMF through 2010, and has averaged 3.70% for the last 6 years (2011 – 2016). ROE was 6.2% in 2015, and 6.7% in 2016. ROE is expected to be 7.50% for F2017 and 8.0% for F2018. ROA has been NMF through 2010, and has averaged 0.463% for the last 6 years (2011 – 2016). ROA was 0.74% in 2015, and 0.82% in 2016. ROA is expected to be 0.90% for F2017 and 0.95% for F2018. Average P/E has been NMF through 2014. P/E was 12.6% in 2015, and 10.3% in 2016. Projected eps for F2018 is \$2.13 which equates to a forward P/E of 12.86X.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Book Value is projected at \$25 per share. Price to Book would be 1.10X. Prior to the financial crisis Price to Book was often over 1.5X. This would equate to a share price of \$37.50.

I would not consider selling below 1.5X book value, and that would equate to \$37.50 per share.

I would also not consider selling unless forward P/E was $> 15X$. I project F2017 eps to be \$1.80, and that seems conservative at this point. Using \$1.80 of F2017 earnings, a price of \$27.00 would warrant a consideration. Yet, again, I have no new estimate, but I suspect I would not even consider selling unless price was \$37.50. At that point, I might pare it down.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Gazprom (OGZPY) \$4.285 October 31, 2017

Contrarian investment based on the perception of “blood in the streets,” and the fear and detest of the masses investing in Russia. This is primarily based on the perception of most developed nations of the Russian Government, and the Russian geopolitical situation.

We offset that with what I consider to be an incredibly inexpensive stock, and potential resolution of the Geopolitical situation.

We project earnings to be ~\$1.25 for F2017, and hence the Price/Earnings ratio is 3.43X. We project Book Value for F2015 to be ~\$15 per share, and hence price/Book value is a low 0.29X. Return on Equity (ROE) is projected to be 6%. We project a dividend of \$0.28 generates a dividend yield of ~6.5%. Gazprom carries a debt/equity ratio of < 20%, which is fairly strong. Interest coverage ratio is strong.

Dagon ratings agency continues to give Gazprom AAA ratings. Standard and Poor's rates the credit BB+ outlook positive (**upgraded from stable on 6/1/17**), and Moody's rates it Ba1, outlook stable (**upgraded from negative on 2/21/17**), both being considered non-investment grade.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Citigroup (C) \$73.50 October 31, 2017 Page 1 of 2

Citigroup is one of the largest financial institutions in the United States and the world. The Price to Book value and forward P/E are low relative to their historic averages. Historically, Citi has often been priced in the past at 1.5X Book Value. Price to Book is primary reason for owning, accompanied by an expected increase in net interest margin as interest rates start to rise. Thesis is based on continued earnings growth. I expect that dividend increases will continue to occur, as the government continues to relax its stance on Citigroup via future stress tests.

Yield is 1.74% (\$1.28). Earnings expected at \$5.10 which would give a P/E of 14.41X. Dividend payout has averaged NMF through 2011. The payout ratio was 3% in F2015, and 9% in F2016. Dividend payout ratio expected to be 18% and 22% for F2017 and F2018 respectively. ROE has been NMF through 2009, and has averaged 5.96% for the last 7 years (2010 – 2016). ROE was 7.8% in 2015, and 6.6% in 2016. ROE is expected to be 6.50% for F2017 and 7.0% for F2018. ROA has been NMF through 2009, and has averaged 0.645% for the last 7 years (2010 – 2016). ROA was 1.0% in 2015, and 0.83% in 2016. ROA is expected to be 0.75% for F2017 and 0.85% for F2018. Average P/E has been NMF through 2009, and has averaged 12.02% for the last 7 years (2010 – 2016). Projected eps for F2018 is \$5.85 which equates to a forward P/E of 12.56.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Book Value is projected at \$80 per share. Price to Book would be 0.92X. Prior to the financial crisis Price to Book was often over 1.5X. This would equate to a share price of \$120.00.

I would not consider selling below 1.5X book value, and that would equate to \$120.00 per share.

I would also not consider selling unless forward P/E was $> 15X$. I project F2017 eps to be \$5.10, and that seems conservative at this point. Using \$5.10 of F2017 earnings, a price of \$76.50 would warrant a consideration. Yet, again, I have no new estimate, but I suspect I would not even consider selling unless price was \$120. At that point, I might pare it down.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

JP Morgan Chase (JPM) \$100.61 October 31, 2017 Page 1 of 2

One of the world's largest and most respected Financial Services organizations. Jamie Dimon is the CEO. He is widely respected, and he seems to "tell it like it is." The Price to Book value and P/E are low relative to their historic averages. Prior to the financial crisis, JPM traded at 2 to 3 times tangible book. Price to Book is primary reason for owning, accompanied by an expected increase in net interest margin if interest rates start to rise. Thesis is based on continued earnings growth. I expect that dividend increases will continue to occur, as the government continues to relax its stance on JP Morgan Chase via future stress tests.

Yield is 2.23% (\$2.24). Earnings expected at \$6.95 which would give a P/E of 14.48X. Dividend payout has averaged 27.44 for 9 years, whereas 2008 was NMF due to the financial crisis. The payout ratio was 33% in F2015, and 34% in F2016. Dividend payout ratio expected to be 32% and 30% for F2017 and F2018 respectively. ROE has averaged 8.98 for the last 10 years. ROE is expected to be 10.0% for F2017 and 10.0% for F2018. ROA has averaged .792 for the last 10 years. ROA is expected to be 0.95% for F2017 and 0.95% for F2018. Average P/E for the last 9 years has been 10.77, whereas 2008 was NMF due to the financial crisis. Projected eps for F2018 is \$7.48 which equates to a forward P/E of 13.45.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

JP Morgan Chase (JPM) \$100.61 October 31, 2017 Page 2 of 2

Book Value is projected at \$68 per share. Price to Book would be 1.48%. Prior to the financial crisis Price to Book was often over 1.5X. This would equate to a share price of \$102.00.

I would not consider selling below 1.5X book value, and that would equate to \$102.00 per share. I previously modeled based on forward book value, which I previously projected for F2017 to be \$67.25. I previously projected tangible book value to be \$54.00. Both projections look to be conservative, and should be surpassed.

I would also not consider selling unless forward P/E was > 15X. I previously projected F2017 eps to be \$6.30, and that seems conservative at this point. Using \$6.95 of earnings, a price of \$104.25 would warrant a consideration. I would not even consider selling unless price was \$102. At that point, I might pare it down.

Please refer to our disclosures page.



Exxon Mobil(XOM) \$83.35 October 31, 2017

Exxon is a diversified energy company which produces not just oil, but also is the largest natural gas producer in the USA. They explore, develop, refine, distribute, drill and are one of the largest petrochemical suppliers in the world. They have successfully done this for over 100 years. Standard and Poor's credit rating is 'AA+' Outlook Negative (5/24/17). Moody's credit rating is 'Aaa' 6/7/17.

Yield is 3.70% (\$3.08). Earnings expected at \$3.50 which would give a P/E of 23.81X. Dividend payout has averaged NMF% for the last 10 years, and 34.0 for 9 of last 10 years, as 2016 was NMF. Dividend payout ratio expected to be 87% for F2017 and 77% for F2018. ROE has averaged 21.21% for the last 10 years. ROE is expected to be 8.50% for F2017, and 9.50% for F2018. ROTC has averaged 20.12% for the last 10 years. ROTC is expected to be 7.50% for F2017, and 8.50% for F2018. Average P/E for the last 10 years has been 16.18 X. Projected eps for F2018 is \$4.10 which equates to a forward P/E of 20.33X.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

PBF Energy (PBF) \$28.97 October 31, 2017

PBF Energy is one of the largest independent petroleum refiners and suppliers of unbranded transportation fuels, heating oil, petrochemical feedstocks, lubricants and other petroleum products in the United States. PBF Energy's refineries are in California, Delaware, Louisiana, New Jersey and Ohio.

Yield is 4.14% (\$1.20). Earnings expected at (\$0.55) which would give a P/E of NMFX. Dividend payout has averaged NMF% for the last 10 years. Dividend payout ratio expected to be NMF% for F2017 and 45% for F2018. ROE has averaged NMF% for the last 10 years. ROE is expected to be NMF% for F2017, and 12.0% for F2018. ROTC has averaged NMF% for the last 10 years. ROTC is expected to be NMF% for F2017, and 7.50% for F2018. Average P/E for the last 10 years has been NMF X. Projected eps for F2018 is \$2.65 which equates to a forward P/E of 10.93X.

Their recent reporting of 9 months ended September 30, 2017, the earnings and revenues were well ahead of expectations. I find PBF to be fairly undervalued, and based on current data and thesis, I wouldn't think of selling unless it went to \$55 per share or so. The thesis is always a changing road map. Baupost Group, led by Seth Klarman, owns approximately 15.72M shares, or 14.29% of PBF, as of June 30, 2017.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Intel (INTC \$45.49) October 31, 2017

Intel designs and manufactures advanced integrated digital technology platforms. Intel is in the heart of the interconnectivity of devices from PCs, smart phone, automobiles and cloud data centers.

Intel is a world leader in technology at prices that are fundamentally inexpensive relative to their industry and history. At the same time, Intel has a fortress balance sheet. Company carries a solid dividend, and one that seems sustainable.

Yield is 2.78% (\$1.092). Earnings expected at \$3.00 which would give a P/E of 13.13X. Dividend pay-out has averaged 43.2% for the last 10 years. The payout ratio was 37% in F2016, and 40% in F2015. Dividend payout ratio expected to be 36% and 36% for F2017 and F2018 respectively. ROE has averaged 18.92% for the last 10 years. ROE is expected to be 19.5% for F2017 and 19.0% for F2018. ROTC has averaged 16.33% for the last 10 years. ROTC is expected to be 16.0% for F2017 and 16.0% for F2018. Average P/E for the last 10 years has been 14.63X. Projected eps for F2018 is \$3.10 which equates to a forward P/E of 12.71X.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

COP is one of the world's largest exploration and production companies.

As the industry has gone through hell since 2015. Thesis really tied into price of Oil and Natural Gas, commodity exposure, international growth exposure and recovering economy. We are buying, what I think is a sustainable dividend at historically proper fundamentals. I think it is impossible to project earnings and cash flow. The price of the commodities will constantly change. Yet, this is a healthy company, which is reinvesting in its core competence. COP is focused on balance sheet strength, and has been materially paring down her assets and bringing down debt loads. Over last six months, COP has signed agreements to shed over \$16.5B in holdings. This will be used to reduce debt. Share repurchase authorization increased to \$6.0B. Shares outstanding projected to be 1,190 at December 31, 2017. This was previously expected to be 1,225.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Conoco Phillips (COP) \$51.15 October 31, 2017 Page 2 of 2

Yield is 2.07% (\$1.06). Earnings expected at \$0.35 which would give a P/E of 146.14X. Dividend pay-out has averaged less than 50% average for 8 years ending 2015, and then there were losses and NMG. The payout ratio was NMF% in F2015, and NMF% in F2016. Dividend payout ratio expected to be NMF% and 88% for F2017 and F2018 respectively. ROE has averaged NMF% for the last 10 years. ROE was NMF% in F2015, and NMF% in F2016. ROE is expected to be 1.5% for F2017 and 3.5% for F2018. ROTC has averaged NMF% for the last 10 years. ROTC was NMF% in F2015, and NMF% in F2016. ROTC is expected to be 2.0% for F2017 and 3.5% for F2018. Average P/E for the last 10 years has been NMFX. Projected eps for F2019 is \$1.25 which equates to a forward P/E of 40.92X.

S&P credit rating is 'A-' Lower Rung Upper Medium Outlook Stable (3/31/17)
Moody's credit rating is 'Baa1' Top Rung Lower Medium Grade Outlook Stable (8/3/17).

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Schlumberger (SLB) \$64.00 Page 1 of 2

Schlumberger is the world's leading provider of technology for reservoir characterization, drilling, production, and processing to the oil and gas industry. Schlumberger supplies the industry's most comprehensive range of products and services, from exploration through production and integrated pore-to-pipeline solutions for hydrocarbon recovery that optimize reservoir performance.

The industry and Schlumberger are going through a grueling downturn. The investment thesis is based on a world leader in oilfield services being able to weather the storm.

Thesis really tied into price of Oil and Natural Gas, commodity exposure, international growth exposure and recovering economy. We are buying what we consider a sustainable dividend at historically proper fundamentals. I think it is impossible to project earnings and cash flow. The price of the commodities will constantly change. Yet, we see have a healthy company, which is reinvesting in its core competence. Has a fairly conservative balance sheet. I think this holding is a good paring with XOM and COP for core holdings. I could see this sector bringing a 15% portfolio allocation at the right prices.

Please refer to our disclosures page.

Schlumberger (SLB) \$64.00 Page 2 of 2

Yield is 3.13% (\$2.00). Earnings expected at \$1.45 which would give a P/E of 44.14X. Dividend pay-out has averaged 36.33% for the last 9 years, as F2016 dividend exceeded NI. The payout ratio was NMF% in F2016, and 117% in F2015. Dividend payout ratio expected to be NMF% and 99% for F2017 and F2018 respectively. ROE has averaged 16.52% for the last 10 years. ROE is expected to be 5.0% for F2017 and 8.5% for F2018. ROTC has averaged 13.58% for the last 10 years. ROTC is expected to be 4.0% for F2017 and 7.5% for F2018. Average P/E for the last 10 years has been 28.15X. Projected eps for F2018 is \$2.05 which equates to a forward P/E of 31.22X.

S&P credit rating is 'AA-' Outlook Stable (11/22/13). This is lowest rung of High Grade High Quality.

Moody's credit rating is 'A1' Outlook Stable (4/29/16). This is highest run of High Grade High Quality.

Please refer to our disclosures page.



Important Disclosures

1. Redfield, Blonsky & Starinsky, LLC (RBS), only transacts business in states where it is properly registered, or excluded or exempted from registration requirements.
2. Past performance assumes reinvestment of dividends and other distributions and may not be indicative of future results. Therefore, no current or prospective client should assume that the future performance of any specific investment, investment strategy (including the investments and/or investment strategies recommended and/or purchased by adviser), or product made reference to directly or indirectly in this presentation or on our website, or indirectly via a link to any third-party website, will be profitable or equal to corresponding indicated performance levels. The investment return and principal value of an investment will fluctuate and, when redeemed, may be worth more or less than their original cost.
3. Different types of investments involve varying degrees of risk, and there can be no assurance that any specific investment will either be suitable or profitable for a client's investment portfolio. No client or prospective client should assume that information presented is a substitute for personalized individual advice from the adviser or any other investment professional.
4. Historical performance results for investment indexes, such as the S&P 500, generally do not reflect the deduction of transaction and/or custodial charges or the deduction of an investment-management fee, the incurrence of which would have the effect of decreasing historical performance results of the S&P 500 Index. Whenever RBS performance is referred to, results have been reduced by all fees, including RBS management fee.



Important Disclosures (continued)

5. Returns for the RBS portfolios have been calculated using actual time-weighted returns obtained from all accounts over the time periods indicated. All RBS returns assume the reinvestment of dividends and are shown net of the investment management fees and all other expenses. Please see our form ADV for a full fee disclosure. Actual individual account performance may be materially different from our composite results.

6. RBS files an annual form ADV, which includes an easy to read brochure. Form ADV is a valuable read for anyone interested in learning more about RBS. Additional information about Redfield, Blonsky & Starinsky, LLC is also available on the SEC's website at www.adviserinfo.sec.gov. The searchable IARD/CRD number for Redfield, Blonsky & Starinsky, LLC is 128714.

7. The S&P 500 Index is a widely recognized, unmanaged index of 500 of the largest companies in the United States as measured by market capitalization. The S&P 500 Index performance assumes reinvestment of all dividends and distributions and does not reflect any charges for investment management fees or transaction expenses, nor does the Index reflect any effects of taxes, fees or other types of charges and expenses. The S&P 500 Index is one of many indices and is not necessarily the most appropriate index when comparing performance results.

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